A good deal of confusion and some unhappiness has been caused by persons not seeing what the thing was which was being talked about. —It should first be seen that everything is one thing while it is made up of many things; and it is also part of other things. Take a finger. A finger is a thing, because you can think of it as an instance of reality by itself, or as one. It is as much a thing, as such, as the Pacific Ocean is, or a galaxy.

But a finger is made up of other things. The skin on a finger is just as much a thing as the finger itself; for it, too, can be thought of just as much as the finger or the Pacific Ocean or a galaxy—as an instance of reality by itself, or as one. For the skin of a finger can affect one, and therefore is reality. The bone in a finger, which is a part of the finger, is also a thing in itself. It likewise has, once thought of by itself, reality autonomy, or entity sovereignty. And a finger joint is also a complete thing, as one instance of reality.

And then there is the shape of the finger. The shape of the finger can be seen by itself, even though we know it couldn’t be without the finger (or for that matter, without the hand, or body—at least at the beginning). Since you can draw the shape of the finger and leave the rest of the finger alone, the shape of the finger is affecting the person who draws it—and it can affect anyone.

The question also exists, Is the future of the finger, taken by itself, a thing? Well, you’re thinking of the future of the finger by asking the question: so it becomes a thing. The future of the finger becomes an important matter to a person who has badly injured it, and for that matter, it is to everyone. It is important to see that the shape of a finger and the future of a finger are just as much things as the finger itself.

So, in dealing with a finger as a thing, we have come to these other things: 1, the skin of a finger; 2, the bone of a finger; 3, the joint of a finger; 4, the shape of a finger; 5, the future of a finger. —All these things—and there are many, many more—are aspects or parts of the finger itself. But there are things which arise from the relation of the finger to something larger. (In dealing with the future of the finger, these were implied.)

There is, for example, the relation of the finger to the hand. In a certain sense, it can be seen as one-fifth of a hand. Is one-fifth as such a thing? The answer is Yes. And can the physiological relation of a finger to the palm or upper part of the hand be seen as a thing? Yes. All the relations are things, seen by themselves. Is the relation of a finger to a hand a thing? Yes. Is the relation of a finger to toes a thing? Yes. Is how a finger serves a hand an instance of reality in itself? Yes.

We see, then, what forms a thing can take. It can be said that the whole purpose of our thought is to find out what a thing exactly and wholly is: which means what it can be.